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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PROVO CITY
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 20050087-CA

JAMES GEDO,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred when it basically ignored pro se

motions filed by the Defendant for more than a year and should have required
the prosecution to comply with the Rules of Procedure which require a
response to a motion within 10 days. In fact, eventually the Court did order to
the City to respond to the motions and ordered that the City comply with the
Rules of Civil Procedure which require a response to a motion within 10 days,
and even then did not require the City to respond to all of the motions which
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had been filed and in fact simply denied the motions without a full review.
This motion is preserved by appeal by Gedo's hearing on that issue held May
12,2003. This question is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness,
State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (UT 1995).
2.

Whether the Trial Court erred when it ordered that Defendant

could not submit any of his own motions, as this denied him his constitutional
right to defend himself. The issue was raised by Defendant himself in the
above hearing held May 12, 2003 and also on July 21, 2003. This question is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness, State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d
1196, 1199 (UT 1995).
3.

Whether the trial court erred when it found the Defendant

competent to proceed to trial when the evaluating doctor found that the
Defendant suffered from a mental illness and had extreme difficulty "engaging
in reasons choice of legal strategies and options." This issue was preserved for
trial in hearing regarding competency held September 13, 2004.

This

question is a mixed question of law and fact. The correct standard to use in
determining competency is a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness, while the factual findings of the court are questions of fact and are
reversed only upon a clearly erroneous finding of fault, State v. Harmon, 910
P.2dll96, 1199 (UT 1995).
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

All controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
James Luis Gedo appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment

of the Fourth District Court after being convicted by a jury of Disorderly
Conduct, an Infraction, and Resisting or Interfering with an Officer in the
Discharge of Duty, a Class B Misdemeanor. James Luis Gedo's Co-Defendant
in his matter is Miguel David Gedo, his brother, who is filing a concurrent
appeal in this matter in Case Number 20050086-CA.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
James Luis Gedo was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial

District Court alleging that on or about March 5, 2003 he had committed the
offense of Disorderly Conduct, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Section
76-9-102(l)(b); Utah Code Annotated, and Interference with Arresting
Officer, a Class B misdemeanor, a violation of Section 76-8-305, Utah Code
Annotated.
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On March 24, 2003, the Defendant appeared for arraignment before
Judge Guy R. Burningham; counsel Laura H. Cabanilla was present, and the
pretrial hearing and hearing on motions was scheduled for May 12, 2003.
On March 27, 2003 Defense counsel filed with the Trial Court, packets of
motions received from the Defendant. Defendant's counsel did not advise him
to seek these motions, which he wished filed against her advice. These
motions were similar in nature to other motions filed previously in the
Defendant's other cases before the court; and were also treated similarly by
Defendant's counsel.
Therefore in filing the motions, counsel attached them to a cover sheet
which stated they were being filed at the request of the client but against the
advice of counsel. This same procedure was also filed in Defendant's other
cases which were also proceeding at this time through the lower courts. This
same issue is raised separately in Appellant's Case 20040225-CA.
Additional pretrial motions of the Defendant were similarly filed with
this type of cover sheet from counsel on April 14, 2003; April 22, 2003; and
May 12, 2003. These pretrial motions are too numerous to list here, but are
attached.
The Prosecution did file an objection to some of the motions on April
28, 2003. Provo City filed an Objection to Request for a Six Month Hiatus on
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All Cases; Objection to Defendant's Order to Show Cause for Removing
Defendant's Mexican License Plates Without Court Order, Without
Jurisdiction and Without Cause; however, Provo City did not file any written
objections to the other motions filed by the Defendant.
Further, the Defendant filed his other motions, not through counsel, on
May 12, 2003, the date of the hearing on the motions.
The City of Provo never responded in writing to these motions. On
March 24, 2003, the matter came before the court on hearing on other cases of
the Defendant's which were before the court. The Defendant had not yet been
arraigned on this new charge; however at this hearing on the defendant's other
cases, Counsel for the Defendant raised the issue of the motions not having
been responded to or addressed by the Court.
Counsel had previously filed notices to submit in these separate cases.
The court at that time, noted that new motions had been filed by the Defendant,
the Court stated that the time for the City to respond to these motions was
controlled by the rules, but took no further action other than to continue the
hearing to allow the City further time to respond. Provo City did not respond
to the motions.
On May 12, 2003, the matter came before the court on hearing, and
counsel for the Defendant again raised the issue of the unresponded to motions,
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referring to motions filed in this case, and in the Defendant's other cases then
before the Court, (p.7 of May 12, 2003 hearing). The Court ruled that all
motions filed by the Defendant were denied, finding them "inappropriately
filed, that they request irrelevant and extraneous matters," (p. 42 and of May
12, 2003 transcript).

Further, on p. 46, the Court relieved the City of a

responsibility to respond in accordance with the rules of procedure, stating, "I
think it would be a waste of time really to have the cities respond to these."
However, the Court did grant one of Defendant's motions, which was his
motion for a six month hiatus in the case, (p. 55).
The Defendant was further instructed not to file any motions unless they
were filed through his attorney; and the attorney was instructed not to file
motions on Defendant's behalf unless in her opinion, "they were meritorious or
at least have had valid arguments for their positions, appropriate and relevant,"
(p. 53 and 54.)
On July 21, 2003, the matter again came before the court on a Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel filed by Gedo's counsel, Laura Cabanilla. After an
agreement was entered into regarding client conduct, Laura Cabanilla agreed to
stay on as counsel. This motion had been filed because of the difficulties in
dealing with Defendant Gedo. Gedo's appointed counsel complained of his too
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frequent telephone calls and visits to the office and inappropriate and rude
behavior to staff, as well as difficulties in the client and attorney relationship.
At the same time an issue was raised in that the Defendant had been barred by
the 4th District Court clerks in filing any motions with the Court, whether they
were pleadings in this case or civil cases. The court stated the matter would be
discussed at the next judge's meeting, (see notes entered in court computer
docket for July 21, 2003).
Again on December 17, 2003, another Motion for Withdrawal of
Counsel was filed, due to the same problems as had previously occurred;
although this motion was at the request of the client rather than counsel
because of Gedo's frustration that his counsel was not filing the motions he
desired, this regardless of the Court's order that counsel not file motions unless
they were made by counsel. At the hearing on January 9, 2004 regarding that
motion, the motion was withdrawn by counsel when the client stated he agreed
it was in his best interest to keep counsel.
On June 1, 2004, a motion was made for a Competency Evaluation of
the Defendant's competency to proceed.

This motion was made by the

Defendant's counsel but was vehemently opposed by the Defendant.
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The matter proceeded to trial, and the cases of both the Defendant James
Gedo and Miguel David Gedo were combined at their request, so that they
could sit together at counsel table.
Jury trial was then held December 8 and 9, 2004 in front of Judge
McVey. At the trial defendant was found Guilty of Disorderly Conduct as an
Infraction (he was found Not Guilty of the Class C Misdemeanor); and Guilty
of Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor.
On January 20, 2005 the Defendant was sentenced to statutory
maximums on a Class B misdemeanor, with 10 days imposed and the
remainder stayed. Defendant served this sentence and is not currently
incarcerated.
On January 25, 2005, a timely appeal was filed.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The circumstances surrounding the incident leading to the charges
against the Defendant are as follows: On March 5, 2002, Defendant James
Gedo and his co-defendant, and brother, Miguel David Gedo, were at their
home located at 1741 North 450 West, Provo, Utah. On that same date, Provo
City Parking Cadet Linda Trotter noticed a red and gray GMC Suburban with a
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license plate out of Utah, 148ZRG with a registration display showing the plate
expired 01/00.
Cadet Trotter testified that as she entered the plate information into her
computer to write a ticket for this infraction, information came back from her
accounting department that the vehicle had four or more unpaid parking tickets.
Cadet Trotter stated that she then contacted dispatch and had them run the
plate. Cadet Trotter stated that she wished to do a VIN search but that the VIN
on the dash was covered and the doors were locked. She stated she crawled
under the vehicle on both sides but could not observe one under the vehicle.
Cadet Trotter then called for a tow truck driver who she then asked to
open the door so that she could access the VIN number (p.22). He did open the
door and Cadet Trotter obtained the VIN number which registered to a Kenneth
Parker of American Fork, Utah (proffer of Trotter's testimony, p. 6)
This VIN number was registered to a different plate, Utah 741JHE
which had been sold by the Parkers in 1999, (p. 7). Therefore, the license plate
with the parking tickets belonged to a different vehicle; however, Cadet Trotter
instructed the tow truck driver to impound the vehicle on the basis of the
unpaid parking tickets (p. 22-36, 38 of Trotter's testimony).

(The Gedos

testified that they had recently, in the last several months, purchased the
vehicle. This information comes from a proffer of testimony p. 7).
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Trotter testified that she parked on the other side of the street, some
distance away, while the tow truck officer began to hook up the vehicle to tow
it. She testified that she would not have been seen, and in fact when she
noticed a male individual exit the house and begin to appear to argue with the
tow truck driver, it did not appear that this person was aware of her presence,
(p. 22-36).
The tow truck driver began to place his lift under the Suburban in order
to tow it (p.23). As this occurred, one of the brothers became aware of the tow
truck driver's attempt to tow the vehicle. He then approached and made a
statement to the effect of, "you're not going to steal my car...." (p. 37 Trotter's
testimony).
That individual then reentered the house and both the individuals exited.
Testimony was presented that Miguel Gedo entered the vehicle and attempted
to start it. It did not start and apparently was not running. At this point, Cadet
Trotter, who had been parked on the other side of the street and away from the
tow truck driver, felt that the tow truck driver needed assistance and drove up
to the Suburban, where Miguel Gedo was seated in the driver's side, parallel to
it and in front of the Gedo Suburban. She testified that he opened his car door
into her jeep with such force and violence that he created a dent and three deep
scratches to her vehicle.
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Miguel's testimony was that he opened the door because her vehicle was
so close to his as he was exiting his vehicle that he needed to do so to protect
his leg, and that his car door struck her mirror, not the door panel

Other

evidence presented at trial was not consistent with the cadet's testimony
regarding damage, and Miguel Gedo was found not guilty at trial for the
charge of Criminal Mischief, for which this incident was the basis of that
charge.
Continuing with the parking cadet's testimony, Miguel Gedo then was
able to start the vehicle with the assistance of his brother, and the vehicle was
driven off of the tow truck lift, and parked in the Gedo's driveway. Both
Gedos testified that after exiting the vehicle Miguel Gedo thereupon went to
the front of the vehicle, where the hood had already been placed up by James
Gedo, and began working on the engine while James Gedo then entered the
vehicle. Miguel Gedo started the vehicle, while James Gedo drove it off of the
tow truck lift by backing the vehicle up, almost on the vehicle parked behind
the Suburban, which also belonged to the Gedos, and drove it off onto the curb
and into the Gedo driveway, in their belief that the vehicle could not be taken
once on private property.
Cadet Trotter then testified that she drove into the driveway, parking
behind the Suburban with her jeep in an effort to prevent the Suburban from
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being driven away. She testified that James Gedo approached her vehicle, and
screamed at her. Cadet Trotter called for backup and shortly thereafter several
police vehicles arrived. Various testimonies was elicited from officers who
testified that both brothers had separately and in different directions left the
property, and were shortly located by different officers. Officers testified that
they demanded the Defendants to stop, raise their hands and get down on the
ground.
This testimony was disputed by the Gedos who testified that they did not
disobey the officers' commands. They were thereupon taken into custody and
charged by Information alleging the offenses of Disorderly Conduct a Class C
misdemeanor and Interference with an Officer in the Discharge of Duty, a
Class B misdemeanor.
Prior to trial and due to counsel's concerns over the Defendant James
Gedo's psychological health, and counsel's difficulties with advising him and
his inability to accept her legal advice which she believed was due to his
apparent personality disorders, Defense counsel made a petition for a
determination of competency, which was ordered by the court. Two doctors
were appointed and made evaluations.
On September 13, 2003; hearing was held on the issue of competency
with both Dr. Patrick Panos, PhD and Dr. Cundick, PhD, were subpoenaed to
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testify. Both doctors were present and had previously submitted Competency
Evaluations. In preparing their evaluations, both doctors met with the
Defendant for approximately two hours each and prepared evaluations which
essentially stated that they found the Defendant competent to proceed, but with
extreme reservations, since both doctors had concerns that due to the
defendant's delusions he could not engage in a reasoned choice of legal
strategies and options, as required by Section 77-15-5(a)(iv). (See evaluations
submitted to Court which are part of court record).
In their written evaluations, Dr. Panos and Dr. Cundick similarly found
that James Gedo did suffer from various diagnosed mental illnesses but overall
was able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him; and in all of
the requirements set out in 77-15-5(4) met the competency requirements,
except for 77-15-5(4)(iv), that he be able to engage in a reasoned choice of
legal strategies and options.
As their testimony would have been redundant, only Dr. Panos testified.
He stated that he found that it would be difficult or impossible for the
Defendant to accept his counsel's legal recommendations, if it conflicted with
his own thinking, or dealt with his own legal matters. For instance, while
James Gedo could appreciate that if another individual, not himself, was
charged with a crime, but offered a deal whereby he pled to a lesser charge,
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and perhaps avoid a stiffer penalty, he could understand and recommend that
the individual engage in that process; however, when it came to himself, and
his own legal matters the defendant exhibited such delusions that Dr. Panos
believed it was likely impossible for him to engage in such a reasoned
discussion.
In their evaluations, the doctors noted that the Defendant believed that at
trial he would be vindicated, and not only would he not go to jail, but that the
officers and prosecutors, etc., would be sent to jail or prison by the jury. They
variously describe that he was convinced and even gleeful, that he would
receive a large financial settlement at the expense of the city for their crimes
against him. (This even though he has no legal action pending or filed, and has
not filed even a Notice of Claim against the City.)
Dr. Panos testified at the competency hearing which was held September
13, 2004. According to the transcript of his testimony on that date, he stated
that the defendant James Gedo "had beliefs that would be considered extreme
to the point that, that they would be considered delusional.. .[but] that the he
was not mentally ill in the classical sense that was covered by the statute."
(ppgs. 6-7). In his testimony Dr. Panos expressed frustration several times that
he felt confined by the "statute." What this statute which defined mental
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illness and constrained the doctor in his findings was is not clear, 1 as the
statute regarding competency merely states that:
a person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental
disorder or mental retardation resulting either in:
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings against him or the punishment specified for the offense
charged; or
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding," Section 77-15-2.
Dr. Panos stated that "the type of mental illness he has is not
really covered well by the statute.. .1 mean, he's not psychotic, he's not,
he doesn't, his affect is, is normal." (p.9, 10). And that his mental illness
"won't be treated by medications, hospitalization wouldn't, wouldn't
have any impact on it," (p. 10). Dr. Panos then testified briefly about the
definition of mental illness, saying "there's certain mental illnesses
they're willing to look at. For example, they're not willing to look at
personality disorder and this would be somewhat close to a personality
disorder. Now is personality disorder a mental illness? In my mind it
truly is." (p. 10). In response to the question, does he suffer from a
substantial mental illness, Dr. Panos' reply was "yes." (p. 10).

1

Dr. Panos may have been referring to the DSM-IV Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition. However, certain diagnosis listed in that manual could describe the defendant: 297.1
Delusional Disorder; 301.9 Personality Disorder NOS; etc.
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Dr. Panos admitted in his testimony that he did not complete the
report "for a good four to six weeks afterwards because I kept writing it
and it was very frustrating because I kept changing my mind of how to
phrase things and, because it's a very subtle case." (p. 11). Dr. Panos
admitted he struggled with whether to find the Defendant competent,
"because clearly things were going on that impact his, his ability to, to
engage the, court or the judicial system in a reasonable manner. But,
you know, it wasn't falling within the statute." (p.l 1).
According to Section 77-15-5(a)(iv) UCA, the expert is asked to
determine, among other factors, whether the defendant can "engage in
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options." Regarding that factor,
Dr. Panos testified that "I questioned whether he could rationally
evaluate, you know, realistic options." (Panos Testimony p. 8). Dr.
Panos went on to state that "no, he would not engage in reasonable
consideration of options, that he would be locked into, to his, belief
systems." (p. 8). And with respect to the defendant's relationship with
his legal counsel, "he tended to lecture you about the legal precedence
and the interpretation, and he did not see you as being knowledgeable in
any realistic sense." (p.9)
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With respect to a question posed by prosecutor Rick Romney as to
whether the Defendant could make legal decisions when applied to his
own situation, Dr. Panos replied that, "I see he's extreme to the point
where there is no flexibility at all." (p. 13),
Although the Defendant counsel argued that he be found not competent
to proceed based on the Defendant's inability to engage in a reasoned
discussion of options, and the defendant's inability to accept "what his attorney
will tell him is the legal status when he very strongly believes that there are
these other possibilities2 or that he's being persecuted," the Defendant was
found competent to proceed.
The Court ruled, finding that, "the Defendant was an extremely
intelligent person who understands probably to a greater degree than most
other members of society the nature of the proceedings against him and he is
competent to understand that and.. .he was competent to participate
meaningfully in the preparation and presentation of his defense. The lower
Court found that "the only reservation that Dr. Panos had was in the area of .
maybe Mr. Gedo not being willing to weigh, or not being able or willing to
weigh pros and cons of accepting a plea bargain or something like that because
he's elected to go to trial. And I think, I think that that's probably a pretty
2

Reference here is made to Dr. Panos' earlier testimony that one of the Defendant's delusions was that he
believed he would receive redress in these matters from the federal court, or the World Court, and that his
attorney could not persuade him otherwise, p. 8.
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reasonable response of somebody that wants to go have their day in court.''1
(p-19).
The matter proceeded to trial, and the cases of both the Defendant James
Gedo and Miguel David Gedo were combined at their request, so that they
could sit together at counsel table.
When the Court instructed the jury, he presented an instruction made at
the request of Defendant's counsel, Instruction No. 25, "It is a defense to a
prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of
mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense
charged."
In her closing statement, Defendant's counsel argued that the Defendant
should not be found guilty because of his delusions and mental state.
At sentencing, further reference was made to the Court to consider the
statements of the doctors even in light of the Court's finding of competency, in
that "the doctor found that he was mentally ill and that he was delusional but
[sic] paranoid" (p.5 January 20, 2005 sentencing hearing).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant James Gedo is an individual who insists on "tilting at
windmills," he is an often prickly and difficult person, and has certain
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disabilities which were testified about at trial and at his competency hearing
where Dr. Panos testified he has a "personality disorder" and "delusional
thinking." This results in him often being at odds with the police, the courts,
and even his appointed counsel. However, no matter how difficult he may be,
or even how difficult he may at time even make things for himself, he is still
entitled to equal protection under the law.
The Defendant filed pro se motions, and other motions under a cover
sheet through his attorney. Questions regarding the filing of this motion were
preserved for hearing by this Court by the filing of the motions themselves, as
well as hearing on the matter. The prosecution and the trial court ignored these
motions, which is plain error for the trial court. The trial court erred when it
basically ignored pro se motions filed by the Defendant for more than a year,
then, after ordering the City to respond to the motions, and ordering that Provo
City comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure which require a response to a
motion within 10 days, after they failed to do so, did not require the City to
respond to all of the motions which had been filed and in fact simply denied
the motions without full review. This issue was preserved for appeal by
Gedo's hearing on that issue held May 12, 2003.
Also, the trial court erred when it ordered that Defendant could not
submit any of his own motions, as this denied him his constitutional right to

19

defend himself. The acts by the Fourth District Court in not even accepting
any documents filed by the Defendant further demonstrate the denial of his
constitutional rights.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE REQUIRED THE PROSECUTION
TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF PROCEDURE WHICH REQUIRE A
RESPONSE TO A MOTION WITHIN 10 DAYS; SHOULD NOT HAVE
IGNORED NOTICES TO SUBMIT REGARDING THESE MOTIONS AND
THEN FINALLY ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS WITHOUT A
FULL AND FAIR REVIEW.
Previous to the trial, Defendant had requested that numerous motions be
filed with the Court. Defendant filed some motions on his own, and others
through counsel. His attorney did not submit the motions through her own
arguments, but instead, Counsel for the Defendant handled these motions
requested by the Defendant by simply attaching them to a cover sheet which
stated that the motions were filed with the Court at the request of the client, but
against the advice of counsel.
The Defendant continued to request that his counsel file various motions
on his behalf, and Defendants counsel continued to file motions of this sort,
calling the pleadings "Pre-Trial Motions of Defendant," with a cover sheet
stating that the motions were filed April 14, 2003; April 22, 2003; and May 12,
2003. After the Court ordered the City to respond to the motions, the
20

Prosecution did file an objection to some of the motions on April 28, 2003:
Objection to Request for a Six Month Hiatus on All Cases; Objection to
Defendant's Order to Show Cause for Removing Defendant's Mexican License
Plates Without Court Order, Without Jurisdiction and Without Cause.
The Defendant filed his own motions, not through counsel, on May 12,
2003, the date of the hearing on the motions.
The City of Provo never responded in writing to these motions. On
March 24, 2003, the matter came before the trial court on hearing on other
cases of the Defendant's which were before the court. The Defendant had not
yet been arraigned on this new charge; however at this hearing on the
defendant's other cases, counsel for the Defendant raised the issue of the
motions not having been responded to or addressed by the trial court. Counsel
had previously filed notices to submit in these separate cases. The court noted
that new motions had been filed by the Defendant, the court stated that the time
for the City to respond to these motions was controlled by the rules, but took
no further action other than to continue the hearing to allow the City further
time to respond. Provo City did not respond to the motions.
On May 12, 2003, the matter came before the court on hearing, and
counsel for the Defendant again raised the issue of the unresponded to motions,
referring to motions filed in this case, and in the Defendant's other cases then
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before the Court, (p.7 of May 12, 2003 hearing). The Court ruled that all
motions filed by the Defendant were denied, finding them "inappropriately
filed, that they request irrelevant and extraneous matters/5 (p. 42 and of May
12, 2003 transcript).

Further, on p. 46, the Court relieved the City of a

responsibility to respond in accordance with the rules of procedure, stating, "I
think it would be a waste of time really to have the cities respond to these."
however, the Court did grant one of Defendant's motions, which was his
motion for a six month hiatus in the case, (p. 55).
The Defendant was further instructed not to file any motions unless they
were filed through his attorney; and the attorney was instructed not to file
motions on Defendant's behalf unless they were meritorious or at least have
had valid arguments for their positions, appropriate and relevant, p. 53 and 54.
In fact, clerks of the 4th District Court at this time refused to accept any
motions which the Defendant attempted to file, even going so far as to refuse to
accept even pleadings in civil cases the Defendant attempted to file. This
matter was raised in hearing in July 21, 2003 and is mentioned in the court
computer docket.
Rule 7(b)(1) Motions, orders and other papers, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, states that "an application to the court for an order shall be by
motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing,
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shall state with particularity the grounds therefore, and shall set forth the relief
sought." Gedo did meet this requirement with all of the series the motions
filed by himself, and those filed through his attorney but with the cover sheet
which stated that they were filed against the advice of counsel.
Since the Defendant's various motions did set forth claims for relief, in
accordance with Rule 8(a) URCP it would naturally follow that there should be
some response to those claims for relief, and a failure of the City to respond to
those claims for relief would be a failure to deny. Paragraph 8(d) URCP states
that "[ajverments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required,
other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in
the responsive pleading." Therefore, a failure of the prosecution to respond
and deny the claim for relief would mean that they were admitted.
There is, in these above statutes, no requirement that the motions or
claims for relief actually be demonstrated to have merit first before filing. The
determination of merit would occur at hearing.

The simple decision of a

prosecutor to ignore motions he deems to be baseless does not preserve the
Defendant's due process rights.
The court reminded the prosecution that they needed to follow the Rules
of Civil Procedure, yet when they did not do so, the Court allowed and
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overlooked that omission and simply denied the motions. By so doing, the
Court effectively denied the Defendant his due process.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT TO
FILE ANY OF HIS OWN MOTIONS WITH THE COURT NOT FILED BY
HIS ATTORNEY AS TO NOT ALLOW THIS IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure makes several
requirements for pleadings, motions etc., which are filed with the court. Rule
11(b) states that by,
"presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or unrepresented
party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1)
it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of the
litigation;
(2)
the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3)
the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4)
the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief
When the Defendant's counsel simply filed his motions by attaching a
cover sheet, which, although signed by the attorney, stated that the motions
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were filed against the advice of counsel, counsel was, in effect, not certifying
the motions as set out above. However, Gedo in his own motions did believe,
to the best of his knowledge information and belief that the motions were
proper. He did sign the motions which were submitted. Arguably, some of his
motions and requests would appear so bizarre that our argument regarding the
Defendant's incompetency should be strengthened.
However, for the Court simply to not allow Gedo to file motions, and
even as occurred later, instruct their clerks not to accept any paperwork from
the Gedos that did not come through an attorney, was improper and a violation
of Gedo5 s constitutional right of access to the court. This was a violation of the
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that no State
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
In response to the argument that Gedo could file motions through his
attorney, or by himself if unrepresented, Section 12, Rights of Accused
persons, Utah Constitution states that "In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel...."
[emphasis added].
Therefore, Gedo should have been allowed the right to file motions on
his own behalf, not necessarily only through counsel, and still receive the
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benefit of counsel. That he was not allowed to do this was a violation of his
constitutional rights and the charges against him should be ordered dismissed
as a remedy.
POINT III
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THE
DEFENDANT COMPETENT TO PROCEED TO TRIAL WHEN THE
EVALUATING DOCTOR FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD
EXTREME DIFFICULTY "ENGAGING IN REASONED CHOICE OF
LEGAL STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS."
It is well established that due process requires that a defendant be
mentally competent to plead guilty and to stand trial, State v. Arguelles, 63
P.3d 73, (Utah Supreme Court, 2003).
"A mentally incompetent defendant can provide no defense, and
proceedings against such a defendant do not comport with due process."
Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, f 12, 20P.3d382 (quoting State v. Young, 780
P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1989)); see also York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 594
(Utah Ct.App. 1994) ("Due process requires that a defendant be competent to
plead guilty."); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d
103 (1975) (stating that prohibition against subjecting mentally incompetent
defendant to trial is fundamental to adversarial system of justice).
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Section 77—15-1 of the Utah Code mandates that "[n]o person who is
incompetent to proceed shall be tried for a public offense." Utah Code Ann. §
77—15—1 (2002). Section 77—15—2 defines a defendant's incompetency to
proceed as an "inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for the offense
charged; or ... his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2(l)-(2) (2002).
In Arguelles, the Supreme Court of Utah held that "[i]n determining
whether a defendant is competent to plead guilty, the trial court must consider
whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him." State v. Holland, 921
P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Godinez v.
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993)).
"'[Competency is established when a defendant can, but not necessarily will,
assist or consult with counsel.'" State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,151, 20 P.3d
342 (quoting State v. Woodland, 945P.2d665, 668 (Utah 1997)).
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Dr. Panos testified at a competency hearing which was held September
13, 2004. According to the transcript of his testimony on that date, he stated
that the defendant James Gedo "had beliefs that would be considered extreme
to the point that, that they would be considered delusional.. .[but] that the he
was not mentally ill in the classical sense that was covered by the statute."
(ppgs. 6-7). In his testimony Dr. Panos expressed frustration several times that
he felt confined by the "statute." What this statute which defined mental
illness and constrained the doctor in his findings was is not clear,3 as the
statute in Section 77-15-2, regarding competency merely states that:
a person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental
disorder or mental retardation resulting either in:
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings against him or the punishment specified for the offense
charged; or
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding,"
Dr. Panos stated that "the type of mental illness he has is not
really covered well by the statute.. .1 mean, he's not psychotic, he's not,
he doesn't, his affect is, is normal." (p.9,10). And that his mental illness
"won't be treated by medications, hospitalization wouldn't, wouldn't
3

Dr. Panos may have been referring to the DSM-IV Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition. However, certain diagnosis listed in that manual could describe the defendant: 297.1
Delusional Disorder; 301.9 Personality Disorder NOS; etc. .
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have any impact on it." (p. 10) Dr. Panos then testified briefly about the
definition of mental illness, saying "there's certain mental illnesses
they[re willing to look at. For example, they're not willing to look at
personality disorder and this would be somewhat close to a personality
disorder. Now is personality disorder a mental illness? In my mind it
truly is." (p. 10). In response to the question, does he suffer from a
substantial mental illness, Dr. Panos' reply was "yes." (p. 10).
Dr. Panos admitted in his testimony that he did not complete the
report "for a good four to six weeks afterwards because I kept writing it
and it was very frustrating because I kept changing my mind of how to
phrase things and, because it's a very subtle case." (p. 11). Dr. Panos
admitted he struggled with whether to find the Defendant competent,
"because clearly things were going on that impact his, his ability to, to
engage the, court or the judicial system in a reasonable manner. But,
you know, it wasn't falling within the statute." (p. 11).
Also under Section 77-15-5(a)(iv) the expert is asked to
determine, among other factors, whether the defendant can "engage in
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options." Regarding that factor,
Dr. Panos testified that "I questioned whether he could rationally
evaluate, you know, realistic options." (Panos Testimony p. 8). Dr.
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Panos went on to state that "no, he would not engage in reasonable
consideration of options, that he would be locked into, to his, belief
systems." (p. 8). And with respect to the defendant's relationship with
his legal counsel, "he tended to lecture you about the legal precedence
and the interpretation, and he did not see you as being knowledgeable in
any realistic sense." (p.9)
With respect to a question posed by prosecutor Rick Romney as to
whether the Defendant could make legal decisions when applied to his
own situation, Dr. Panos replied that, "I see he's extreme to the point
where there is no flexibility at all." (p. 13),
After argument from counsel that the Defendant be found not competent
to proceed, based on the Defendant's inability to engage in a reasoned
discussion of options, and the defendant's inability to accept "what his attorney
will tell him is the legal status when he very strongly believes that there are
these other possibilities4 or that he's being persecuted," the Defendant was
found competent to proceed. The Court ruled, finding that, "the Defendant was
an extremely intelligent person who understands probably to a greater degree
than most other members of society the nature of the proceedings against him
and he is competent to understand that and.. .he was competent to participate
4

Reference here is made to Dr. Panos' earlier testimony that one of the Defendant's delusions was that he
believed he would receive redress in these matters from the federal court, or the World Court, and that his
attorney could not persuade him otherwise, p. 8.
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meaningfully in the preparation and presentation of his defense. The only
reservation that Dr. Panos had was in the area of maybe Mr. Gedo not being
willing to weight, or not being able or willing to weight pros and cons of
accepting a plea bargain or something like that be he's elected to go to trial.
And I think, I think that that's probably a pretty reasonable response of
somebody that wants to go have their day in court." (p. 19).
The lower Court should have found the competency evaluations
inadequate and ruled the Defendant incompetent when the evaluator used an
inappropriate standard in determining the competency of the Defendant. While
the evaluator found that the Defendant suffered from a mental illness, and
found that he had an inability to participate in the proceedings against him with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding, as required under 77-15-2; and a
lack of an ability to engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options,
yet, because the doctor operated under a misconception of what the law
required, his report indicated that he found the defendant competent. The
lower court should have corrected this misapplication of the law.
On review by this Court, the Court of Appeals should review for plain
error whether the trial court should have deemed the competency evaluations
inadequate, Arguelles at 747. Any factual findings by the court should be
reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard, Harmon at 1199.
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There have been indications throughout the Defendant's contacts with
the lower Court that there could be a concern regarding the Defendant's
competency. Even the many motions filed with the Court which are the basis
of the first two arguments in this appeal should indicate an imbalance with the
Defendant's mental competency. As well, the motions filed by counsel to
withdraw from representation demonstrate a difficulty on the Defendant's part
to engage with counsel in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options.
Certainly these examples were due to the mental illness suffered by the
Defendant which was diagnosed by his evaluators as paranoid delusional
thinking and personality disorder. (See evaluations which are part of the court
record).
Appellant argues that the competency evaluation was inadequate because
it relied on an improper requirement regarding a finding of mental illness.
Even though Dr. Panos testified that he believed the Defendant to be
delusional, paranoid and had a personality disorder, he felt constrained that the
"statute" did not allow him to find this to be mental illness. However, the
doctor believed that the Defendant did have a mental illness, as demonstrated
when he testified that the Defendant could not engage in a reasoned choice of
legal strategies and options, saying, "I'm of the opinion that it's due to mental
illness," (Competency Hearing, p. 9).
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Even so, the Court decided that the Defendant could engage in a
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options, finding, "I'm not finding
anything that would, here that would because of mental disease or defect
would, would, would [sic] defeat Mr. Gedo's ability to meaningfully
participate in his defense. In fact, it sounds like he's made a pretty rational
choice here. And so Fm going to find that he is competent now, to proceed to
trial and, and to help with his defense," (Competency Hearing, p. 20).
In State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, (Sup Court 2001) the Court held that it
was harmless error where the written competency reports did not specifically
address all of the factors listed in section 77—15-5 but all the relevant factors
were addressed through the reports and subsequent hearing. In State v.
Arguelles, 63 P.3d at 749, the Utah Supreme Court found a similar situation,
stating that, "[although the written reports do not use the precise language of
the statute or organize their analysis by the statutory factors, the reports, in
combination with the testimony offered at the competency hearing, specifically
address Arguelles' abilities in such a way that all the relevant statutory factors
are considered.
We are not arguing that the relevant statutory factors were not
considered, or that some factors were left out of the evaluations and not
considered; our argument is that they were considered and specific items
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included in the evaluations of both doctors and in the testimony itself of Dr.
Panos that do address specific factors in such a way that a finding of
incompetency should have been made, yet due to a confusion of the doctors
regarding what was required for a finding of mental illness, that he was not
found incompetent.
In State v. Lafferty, at 1249, the Court found that "the relevant inquiry
[under section 77-15-2] is whether [the defendant] had the ability to assist
counsel, not whether he in fact chose to assist counsel or to comply with all of
counsel's wishes5' (emphasis in original.)
Here, the Defendant lacked the ability to assist counsel. Based on
the doctor's findings, the defendant lacked the ability to assist counsel.
When Dr. Panos was asked on the stand whether the defendant could
"engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options," Dr. Panos
testified that "I questioned whether he could rationally evaluate, you
know, realistic options." (Panos Testimony p. 8). Dr. Panos went on to
state that "no, he would not engage in reasonable consideration of
options, that he would be locked into, to his, belief systems." (p. 8). And
with respect to the defendant's relationship with his legal counsel, "he
tended to lecture you about the legal precedence and the interpretation,
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and he did not see you as being knowledgeable in any realistic sense."
(P-9)
In sum, the lower court erred in finding the Defendant competent;
perhaps based in part on the evaluating doctors' confusion about the
requirements under Sections 77-15-2 and 77-15-5(4). That therefore the
Defendant's convictions should be dismissed as an incompetent person
cannot with any due process, be required to stand trial.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Gedo asks this Court, should it
rule in Appellant's favor on Points I and/or II, which relate to error
which Appellant claims in that his motions filed with the court were not
allowed due process, to reverse his convictions for Disorderly Conduct,
an Infraction; and Interference with an Arresting Officer, a Class B
misdemeanor. Further, should this court rule, finding that the lower
court erred in finding the Defendant competent, Defendant's convictions
should be dismissed as an incompetent person cannot with any due
process, be required to stand trial
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ADDENDA
Section 12 Rights of Accused persons, Utah Constitution states that "In
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel...."
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or unrepresented
party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(5)
it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of the
litigation;
(6)
the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted b y existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(7)
the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(8)
the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief
Rule 8 Utah Rules Civil Procedure
General rules of pleadings.
(a)
Claims for relief A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded.

(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon
which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a
qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and
material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good
faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make
his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he
may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert all
its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set
forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption
of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel,
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches,
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations,
waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.
When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat
the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted
when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which
no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or
avoided.

Rule 7(b) URCP Motions
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made
during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall
be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state
succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief
sought.
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Section 77-15-2. Definition of "Incompetent to Proceed"
a person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental
disorder or mental retardation resulting either in:
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings against him or the punishment specified for the offense
charged; or
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding
77-15-5 Order for hearing — Stay of other proceedings — Examinations of
defendant — Scope of examination and report.
(1) When a petition is filed pursuant to Section 77-15-3 raising the issue of
the defendant's competency to stand trial or when the court raises the issue of
the defendant's competency pursuant to Section 77-15-4, the court in which
proceedings are pending shall stay all proceedings. If the proceedings are in a
court other than the district court in which the petition is filed, the district court
shall notify that court of the filing of the petition. The district court in which
the petition is filed shall pass upon the sufficiency of the allegations of
incompetency. If a petition is opposed by either party, the court shall, prior to
granting or denying the petition, hold a limited hearing solely for the purpose
of determining the sufficiency of the petition. If the court finds that the
allegations of incompetency raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's
competency to stand trial, it shall enter an order for a hearing on the mental
condition of the person who is the subject of the petition.
(2) (a) After the granting of a petition and prior to a full competency
hearing, the court may order the Department of Human Services to examine the
person and to report to the court concerning the defendant's mental condition.
(b) The defendant shall be examined by at least two mental health experts
not involved in the current treatment of the defendant.
(c) If the issue is sufficiently raised in the petition or if it becomes apparent
that the defendant may be incompetent due to mental retardation, at least one
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expert experienced in mental retardation assessment shall evaluate the
defendant. Upon appointment of the experts, the petitioner or other party as
directed by the court shall provide information and materials to the examiners
relevant to a determination of the defendant's competency and shall provide
copies of the charging document, arrest or incident reports pertaining to the
charged offense, known criminal history information, and known prior mental
health evaluations and treatments.
(d) The prosecuting and defense attorneys shall cooperate in providing the
relevant information and materials to the examiners, and the court may make
the necessary orders to provide the information listed in Subsection (2)(c) to
the examiners. The court may provide in its order for a competency
examination of a defendant that custodians of mental health records pertaining
to the defendant shall provide those records to the examiners without the need
for consent of the defendant or further order of the court.
(3) During the examination under Subsection (2), unless the court or the
executive director of the department directs otherwise, the defendant shall be
retained in the same custody or status he was in at the time the examination
was ordered.
(4) The experts shall in the conduct of their examination and in their report
to the court consider and address, in addition to any other factors determined to
be relevant by the experts:
(a) the defendant's present capacity to:
(i) comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations against him;
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind;
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties,
if applicable, that may be imposed in the proceedings against him;
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options;
(v) understand the adversary nature of the proceedings against him;
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable;
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(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on the
nature and quality of the defendant's relationship with counsel;
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently being administered:
(i) whether the medication is necessary to maintain the defendant's
competency; and
(ii) the effect of the medication, if any, on the defendant's demeanor and
affect and ability to participate in the proceedings.
(5) If the expert's opinion is that the defendant is incompetent to proceed,
the expert shall indicate in the report:
(a) which of the above factors contributes to the defendant's incompetency;
(b) the nature of the defendant's mental disorder or mental retardation and
its relationship to the factors contributing to the defendant's incompetency;
(c) the treatment or treatments appropriate and available; and
(d) the defendant's capacity to give informed consent to treatment to restore
competency.
Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 12, Rights of Accused personsvUtah Constitution,
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel...
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